Complete this file locally, then use your browser’s Print command to save a PDF. Entries are not saved automatically. No data is sent anywhere. Avoid entering passwords, secrets or sensitive evidence; reference a controlled evidence repository instead.
Use Pass only after verification. Gap means the requirement is not met; Not tested means no conclusion. For an accepted exception or a check outside scope, record the reason and approver.
Identity, privileged access and tenant ownership
Microsoft Entra admin center, Microsoft 365 admin center and partner relationships.
ID01 · Account and owner inventory
Verify: Export enabled members, guests, service accounts and owners; reconcile them with current staff and suppliers.
Assessment: Every enabled identity has a current purpose and accountable owner. Investigate orphaned or unexplained accounts.
ID02 · Privileged assignments
Verify: Inspect active and eligible roles, group membership and delegated administrator relationships.
Assessment: Each grant is justified; daily work uses a separate account. Unexplained standing privilege is a finding.
ID03 · Password and recovery configuration
Verify: Review cloud and synchronised account policies, password reset methods and helpdesk identity checks.
Assessment: Recovery cannot bypass identity verification. Routine cloud-only password expiry is not treated as a security improvement.
ID04 · Emergency access
Verify: Inspect cloud-only recovery accounts, credential custody, strong authentication, alerts and the latest authorised access test.
Assessment: Recovery works independently of normal identity dependencies. Review restrictive policy exclusions and alert on every use.
ID05 · Privileged activation
Verify: Where licensed, examine PIM eligibility, activation duration, approvals and activation records.
Assessment: Privilege is time-limited where appropriate; emergency roles remain recoverable. A disabled or unlicensed feature is recorded honestly.
ID06 · Leavers and external administrators
Verify: Sample recent departures and ended supplier engagements; check sessions, credentials, roles and delegated access.
Assessment: Removal covers all access paths, not only the user account. Retained access has an owner and expiry.
MFA, authentication strength and Conditional Access
Verify: Compare authentication registration with enabled policy scopes, exclusions and sampled sign-in results.
Assessment: Required users actually encounter the intended control. Registration alone, report-only policies and unexplained exclusions do not pass.
AU02 · Phishing-resistant administrator access
Verify: Inspect accepted methods and authentication-strength requirements for privileged sign-ins.
Assessment: Administrators use the required phishing-resistant methods. SMS, push approval or a registered key alone do not prove enforcement.
AU03 · Conditional Access policy behaviour
Verify: Use policy evaluation tools and authorised pilot sign-ins for normal, guest, unmanaged-device and exceptional access.
Assessment: Expected access succeeds and prohibited access is denied. Retain policy IDs, outcomes and approved exceptions.
AU04 · Legacy and unused authentication paths
Verify: Review sign-in protocols, application dependencies and mailbox-level authentication exceptions, including SMTP AUTH usage.
Assessment: Unused paths are disabled; required applications use an approved method. Do not disable a business workflow without validating its replacement.
AU05 · High-risk sign-ins and sessions
Verify: Inspect risk response, session controls, token revocation procedures and the handling of lost devices.
Assessment: There is a tested response to suspected compromise. Distinguish licensed risk automation from manual review and compensating controls.
AU06 · Registration and policy changes
Verify: Review authentication-method changes, Temporary Access Pass issuance and Conditional Access changes for a defined period.
Assessment: Changes have accountable operators and reviewable records. Emergency exclusions do not become a permanent route around protection.
Enterprise applications, consent and workload identities
Entra enterprise applications, app registrations, consent policies and workload sign-in records.
AP01 · Application ownership
Verify: List enterprise applications and registrations; record business purpose, owners and recent use.
Assessment: Each active application has an owner. Dormant or ownerless applications are reviewed before removal or continued approval.
AP02 · Permission scope
Verify: Inspect tenant-wide application permissions and delegated grants, including mail, files and directory access.
Assessment: Permissions match the actual workflow. Broad access without a documented need becomes a prioritised finding.
AP03 · User and administrator consent
Verify: Review who can grant consent, approval workflows and sensitive grants already present.
Assessment: Users cannot silently approve unacceptable access. Existing grants receive review rather than relying only on the current consent setting.
AP04 · Secrets, certificates and federation
Verify: Inspect credential expiry, owners, rotation processes and federated credentials for important workloads.
Assessment: Credentials are controlled and monitored; expired ownership, long-lived secrets and unexpected trust relationships are investigated.
AP05 · App-only access
Verify: Review service-principal sign-ins and how application access is constrained and monitored.
Assessment: The review does not assume that user MFA protects app-only tokens. Unusual access has an investigation and containment path.
AP06 · Removal and incident response
Verify: Sample a retired integration and rehearse the documented process for disabling a compromised application.
Assessment: Revocation covers grants, credentials and continuing automation. The business understands what will stop when access is withdrawn.
Exchange Online, forwarding and domain authentication
Exchange admin center, Defender outbound policies, public DNS and delivered message headers.
EM01 · Mail domains and sending services
Verify: Reconcile accepted domains with all systems that send mail, including finance, support, marketing and website services.
Assessment: Every sender is owned and documented. Obsolete services and unexpected domains are investigated.
EM02 · SPF, DKIM and DMARC alignment
Verify: Inspect DNS and authentication results on authorised test messages from each sending service.
Assessment: Legitimate mail authenticates and aligns with the visible From domain. Plan enforcement changes around validated senders and monitoring.
Assessment: Unapproved external forwarding is prevented. A single tenant setting is not accepted as proof that all paths were checked.
EM04 · Delegation and shared mailboxes
Verify: Export Full Access, Send As and Send on Behalf grants; examine shared-mailbox identities and direct sign-in.
Assessment: Delegation has current owners and business reasons. Unneeded direct sign-in and historic permissions are removed through an approved change.
EM05 · Transport rules and connectors
Verify: Review mail-flow rules, inbound/outbound connectors and trust or filtering bypasses.
Assessment: Exceptions have a limited scope, an owner and a review date. Investigate routing or bypasses unrelated to a current requirement.
EM06 · Suspicious mailbox activity
Verify: Search a defined period for rule changes, forwarding changes and unusual access; correlate with sign-in history.
Assessment: Suspicious changes are resolved or escalated. A configuration review does not declare the tenant breach-free without investigating activity.
Defender for Office 365 and email threat protection
Microsoft Defender portal: email policies, protection coverage, quarantine and incidents.
DF01 · Licensed recipient coverage
Verify: Reconcile users and groups with assigned licences, preset policies, custom policies and exclusions.
Assessment: Expected recipients receive the intended protection. Capture effective policy precedence and missing coverage.
DF02 · Impersonation protection
Verify: Review protected people and domains, actions, thresholds and exceptions.
Assessment: High-impact impersonation targets are included where the capability is used. Stale executives or broad exceptions are corrected.
DF03 · Safe Links behaviour
Verify: Inspect applicable settings, excluded URLs and authorised benign tests in the workloads being used.
Assessment: Protection behaves as intended; exclusions and user override options have an approved rationale.
DF04 · Safe Attachments coverage
Verify: Review attachment policies and the settings for SharePoint, OneDrive and Teams protection where licensed.
Assessment: Each in-scope workload has verified protection. A mail policy alone is not evidence of collaboration-workload coverage.
Assessment: Each collaboration path is reviewed in its own context; external chat access is not confused with guest file access.
CO06 · Unmanaged-device access
Verify: Test approved browser and download restrictions against in-scope SharePoint and OneDrive content.
Assessment: Results match the agreed device policy. Document any access path that permits downloading sensitive data to unmanaged devices.
Intune, endpoints and mobile access
Intune admin center, endpoint protection inventory and effective device access results.
EP01 · Device inventory and ownership
Verify: Reconcile active access with enrolled devices, ownership, operating systems and stale records.
Assessment: Unsupported or unknown devices do not disappear from the audit simply because they are absent from Intune.
EP02 · Compliance enforcement
Verify: Review policy assignments, grace periods, exclusions and sign-in outcomes for a noncompliant test device.
Assessment: Compliance requirements affect access as designed. A compliance dashboard alone is not evidence of enforced access control.
EP03 · Encryption and recovery material
Verify: Sample disk-encryption status and the permissions and process used to retrieve recovery keys.
Assessment: Required devices are encrypted and keys are recoverable only by authorised staff through a controlled process.
EP04 · Endpoint protection health
Verify: Inspect sensor onboarding, active protection, tamper controls and alert connectivity on sampled endpoints.
Assessment: Required protection is healthy and reporting; installed software without current telemetry does not pass.
EP05 · Patching and local privilege
Verify: Review update policy, overdue security updates and local administrator access on representative devices.
Assessment: Exceptions have owners and treatment dates. Administrator rights are justified rather than assigned by convenience.
EP06 · Mobile application protection
Verify: Review app-protection assignments, data-transfer rules, lost-device response and selective wipe where used.
Assessment: Corporate data is handled according to the BYOD policy. Verify the user experience with an authorised test account.
Purview, sensitive data and Copilot readiness
Microsoft Purview, SharePoint permissions and the administration surfaces for the AI features in use.
DP01 · Sensitive-data locations
Verify: Identify where regulated, confidential and commercially sensitive information is stored and who owns it.
Assessment: The review includes actual high-impact locations, not only an empty classification policy or demonstration site.
DP02 · Labels and protection
Verify: Inspect published sensitivity labels, assignment scope and a permitted protected-file access test.
Assessment: Labels and any encryption settings work for the intended audience; the presence of a label alone is not treated as access restriction.
DP03 · Data loss prevention
Verify: Review policy scope, exclusions, simulation/enforcement state and a benign test using synthetic data.
Assessment: The intended action occurs in the relevant workload, and alerts are handled. Record licensing and any unprotected channels.
DP04 · Retention and deletion
Verify: Inspect retention policies, holds, deletion rules and the handling of departed users.
Assessment: Retention follows approved requirements and does not substitute for a tested recovery plan. Resolve conflicting or unintended policies.
DP05 · Copilot content access
Verify: Where deployed, test approved low-privilege identities against representative sensitive-content scenarios and review sharing permissions.
Assessment: Unexpected discoverability is traced to permissions or governance gaps. Do not infer safety solely from a successful Copilot rollout.
DP06 · Agents and connected data
Verify: Inventory AI agents, connectors and other integrations with access to organisational data; inspect consent and data boundaries.
Assessment: Each connection has an owner and approved purpose. Permissions, publication scope and monitoring fit the data it can reach.
Audit logs, detection and investigation readiness
Purview Audit, Entra sign-in/audit logs, Defender and any connected SIEM.
LG01 · Audit capture
Verify: Verify auditing status and retrieve known authorised test events from relevant workloads.
Assessment: Expected events are searchable with actor, action, object and time. Record collection delay and any unavailable events.
LG02 · Retention by log source
Verify: Record retention and export arrangements for Purview, Entra and other relevant logs, including user licensing.
Assessment: Required investigation periods are supported. Do not assume Purview retention also applies to Entra sign-in logs.
LG03 · Log collection health
Verify: Inspect connector health, permissions, ingestion gaps and monitoring of collection failures.
Assessment: A stopped or degraded pipeline produces an actionable alert. Historical events can be retrieved from the intended destination.
LG04 · Privilege and policy alerts
Verify: Test or review detections for administrator changes, consent grants, security-policy changes and emergency-account use.
Assessment: Alert scope includes important change paths and reaches an owner; noise is managed without silencing critical events.
LG05 · Mailbox and data-access detection
Verify: Review detections for suspicious forwarding, unusual downloads and other scenarios relevant to the organisation.
Assessment: Investigators can correlate identities, apps and activity. Record coverage gaps rather than assuming every licence provides every detection.
LG06 · Investigation access and records
Verify: Rehearse log access with the incident-response role and capture an example investigation timeline.
Assessment: Responders have appropriate access, timestamps are interpretable, and evidence handling is documented without copying unnecessary sensitive content.
Recovery, incident response and ongoing governance
Response procedures, backup administration, change records and the risk register.
RC01 · Account-takeover response
Verify: Walk through an authorised scenario covering account isolation, session revocation, app grants and malicious mailbox changes.
Assessment: The team knows who can act and how to preserve evidence. A password reset alone is not the entire containment procedure.
RC02 · Restore capability
Verify: Perform an approved recovery test for representative mail and files; record elapsed time and restored content.
Assessment: Recovery meets agreed business objectives. Recycle bins or retention settings are not accepted as a substitute for a demonstrated restore.
RC03 · Recovery-system access
Verify: Review backup administrators, authentication, deletion rights and dependence on the production tenant.
Assessment: An attacker controlling ordinary tenant access cannot automatically erase every recovery option; dependencies and residual risks are documented.
RC04 · Findings and exceptions
Verify: Review owners, deadlines, risk acceptance, expiry dates and retest evidence for outstanding items.
Assessment: Every unresolved material gap has a decision and an accountable owner. Deferred work is not reported as a passed control.
RC05 · Safe configuration changes
Verify: Inspect pilot groups, change approvals, rollback planning and confirmation of policy effects.
Assessment: Hardening changes are tested before broad enforcement; emergency recovery remains available.
RC06 · Reassessment triggers
Verify: Agree review dates and triggers such as acquisitions, new domains, licence changes, new apps, AI deployments or incidents.
Assessment: The organisation can detect configuration drift between full reviews and update the evidence after material changes.
Basis and scope
Original Atlant Security review questions. These IDs are not CIS or CISA control numbers. This worksheet is not a completed audit report or a certification. Apply the relevant baseline and confirm licensing, business requirements and exceptions.